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
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HARMONY OF
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
BY

A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST



LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
1872

110. k. 431*




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HARMONY

OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

more, that it is written also in a spirit of dutiful obedience to legitimate Church authority.

In our Preface to the Second Edition he will find this passage: 'We never had the slightest idea of transgressing the bounds of strict orthodoxy, and we do not think we have. But if there be any one passage in our book which a competent authority shall declare to be heretical, we withdraw it beforehand; we here and now reject it.'

We are happy to find that, although thus carefully limited within due bounds, our little book has had this success, thus tersly expressed by one of our critics :—'It so far narrows the space that separates the Churches as to make it easy for them to shake hands across it.'

This, our second part, is an Essay towards a reconciliation of the various countries by the establishment, upon a solid basis, of a permanent peace between them. And we are hopeful that our process for cementing the brotherhood of the nations will help forward our project for the sisterhood of the Churches.

We go especially, and at some length, into the case of the International Relationship between this country and Ireland, because we consider a *thoroughly satisfactory* adjustment of that absolutely essential for the prosperous career and the solid security of the Empire; and upon that same reason we rely as sufficient excuse for the uncompromising boldness of our terms of that adjustment.

We are somewhat diffuse upon this branch of the great question before us, for these reason too—We desire to establish in these Islands the most perfect model of Federalism, upon the exemplar of the grand American Confederation, with the view to hold it up as a guiding light to all the nations on the Continent, and to spread amongst them the doctrine of sound Federalism, as it is upon that expansive and prolific principle we build all our hopes of the 'Harmony of International Relations.'

Our 'International,' in its calm procedure of carefully building up, presents a strong contrast, as it will, please God, an irresistible counteraction, to that other fierce and blood-stained 'International' which seems madly bent upon destroying only, blindly and

stupidly heedless or ignorant what to erect upon the ruins.

In our '*Harmony of Social Economy*,' we shall propound a scheme for the amelioration of the social condition of the millions, which though more complete than any Communistic or Socialistic project we have met with, is yet entirely based on Christian principles and a sound political philosophy, and disturbs not in the least the foundations of the existing social order. In the movement which we hope to inaugurate for the advancement of that scheme we shall make an earnest appeal for assistance to every earnest Christian man, and, with more confidence, to every earnest Christian woman in the community, no matter to what special Christian creed appertaining. But in order to

appreciate our scheme duly, and to aid it with zeal, it would be desirable that they should have the whole scheme before them in its full entirety. We would, therefore, entreat all such who shall read these lines, to peruse with some care, and to take an ample note of, our first *Harmony* and this.

Even as we write the joyful news breaks in upon us of the safety of our Prince; and—over and above the thousand other grounds for intense gratification—it will be seen how fortunate we must deem it, that he has been so happily preserved for the performance of the work which we had marked out for him in these pages. To his younger brothers, too, Alfred and Arthur Patrick, we have assigned very useful tasks, which we trust they will have to perform for many years to

come, to the entire satisfaction of the country, and to the great relief of their Royal mother.

NOTE.—The proviso about our *incognito* in the first *Harmony* applies to this.

LONDON, *Dec.* 15, 1871.

HARMONY
OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

—o—

CHAPTER I.

Prefatory Remark—Nullity of our 'Comity of Nations' shown by the late War—The hopeful moral of that War as affecting France and Europe—No more Cæsarism in France—No more wars in Europe—Insufficiency for that end of any 'High Court of Arbitration,'—the Amphictyonic Council—Or, any loose 'Alliance' of Nations,—the Achaian League—Or Our 'Law of Nations'—A true 'Law of Nations'—Glance at the Congress at Washington—United States of Europe—The duty of England—Opportuneness of the cry of 'Home Rule' from Ireland.

IN our first book, the '*Harmony in Religion*,' which appeared in the Spring of last year, we observed in the introductory passages, glancing at the

'Comity of Nations,' how it was a prey to 'deep-seated jealousies and bitter rivalries, portending disastrous wars.' Three months had not elapsed since that utterance, when the very most disastrous war in the record of history swept like an all-withering tornado over the fairest provinces of Europe. We have still scarce recovered from the shock of the appalling spectacle of the two greatest peoples in the world grappled in the death-struggle. And what was the conduct of the 'Comity of Nations' the while? In this gigantic war between Germany and France, did they ever interpose in any shape or form? Never, no never. There they stood passively all around—Scandinavia, and Russia, and Austria, and Italy, and Spain, and—*proh pudor!*—our own England too; this peace-loving, peace-preaching England, shamelessly looking on, some with awe-stricken, others with gloating eyes, and never budging

an inch, or lifting a finger to arrest the hideous havoc—the ruthless ruin at which all mankind stood aghast! Who shall venture to speak again of the 'Comity of Nations?'

Whilst oppressed with the horrors of this monstrous war, we are relieved by two consolatory hopes,—the first, that our good next neighbours, the gallant and acute, the noble and chivalrous French people will now at last be cured effectually of their blind worship of Cæsarism; and that, in their deep and bitter humiliation, they will be mindful of its true cause, and reject with scorn and contempt the audacious advances of their late mock 'Saviour of Society,' and calmly assume and steadily accomplish the great task of saving society themselves, and for themselves; and our second consolation is, that this most disastrous war shall be *the last*. We are boasting every day, and all the nations join in the boastful chorus, of our

all-accomplished and all-accomplishing civilization. We all admit, all nations admit, the whole world admits and proclaims, that war is a barbarism, pure and unmitigated barbarism. Why, then, in God's name, does not this all-accomplishing civilization grapple with that confessed barbarism, and crush its life out? And now that this barbarism affects to be a *science* forsooth, and that the art of killing aims at becoming the finest of the fine arts, surely it is high time to take the matter in hand. What a lofty problem!—but let us attempt it boldly.

That 'High Court of Arbitration' which some would fain rely upon, we must dismiss as insufficient. It would be like the Council of the Amphictyons, in ancient Greece, without any executive power to carry out its decrees. So long as that Council held its meetings in Delphi, a sort of sacredness attached to its decrees, and they were re-

spected by the several States sending deputies to it, as if, at least indirectly, inspired by the god of that famous temple. But when, subsequently, it assembled in a small town near Thermopylæ, it lost its moral influence, and the first encroachment of Philip upon the liberties of Greece was his undertaking to execute its decrees by force of arms. In our 'High Court of Arbitration' we would have none of that divine influence of Apollo, but very possibly we might find a Philip in the Czar of all the Russias, and not at all unlikely *his* process in executing an award of our 'High Court,' touching any State in his neighbourhood, would be to gulp it down bodily with the help of his bear's grease, somewhat after the manner of a huge Boa-constrictor.

Others insist upon some sort of 'Alliance' between the nations comprising the European group. But from what we know of

these alliances—whether 'Holy' or unholy, —how loosely they are constructed, how utterly devoid of the elements of cohesion, and absolutely divested of any administrative capacity, we need not hesitate to dismiss that idea too. And here again we have an old Greek prototype to discountenance this 'Alliance.' It would be—'twould be sure to be—like the Achaian league so painfully elaborated by Aratus. That was never fixed or steady, even in his lifetime; and there was a perpetual variation—states loosely adhering and readily dropping off, just as we see happening in the joints of the crab.

Others again profess great faith in the 'Law of Nations.' But we have no such thing as a Law of Nations. This Law of Nations is a mere moral preachment, pointing out to the nations what they may rightly do, and what they ought not to do, but utterly powerless to say, 'You *shall not* do this that

I disapprove, or you do it at your peril.' It is absolutely but a voice—'a voice and nothing more,' too frequently falling on deaf ears. Not one of these nations heeds it a bit, but each one follows, as far as it safely can, just that course suggested to it by its interests or its ambition. So that we may fling away into the lumber-room our Vattels and Puffendorfs, and all their modern plagiarists and compilers, and try if it may not be possible to create for ourselves a real 'Law of Nations.'

A law, a true effective law, must have a Legislature to enact it, a jurisdicature to declare and expound it, and an executive to enforce its behests with the high hand. The law of each nation says to each citizen, 'Thou shalt not kill, *or else*;' and so, a true Law of Nations will be in a position to say to each nation of the European family, 'Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt make no war

upon, or offer other violence unto thy neighbour nation, *or else.*' What an Utopia! What a dream! Good heavens! no, it is no dream. We have such a Law of Nations in full operation, actually under our eyes, if we will but open them, and cast one glance across the 'melancholy ocean.'

What do we find in the United States of North America? We find an aggregate of nations larger than our Europe. Some of these nation States are larger than our largest kingdoms or empires. Texas is larger than Germany or France. New York and Virginia are larger than England. But the law of the Congress at Washington—a veritable 'Law of Nations'—says to each and every one of the whole group of States, and says in a peremptory tone, with *lictor* and *fasces* at hand, 'Thou shalt do no wrong to thy sister,'—nor does this imply only the wrong of violence by war, but extends to

every species of wrong that one nation, without that law, can inflict upon another.

Look again at this grand Union of sister Nations, just now comprising thirty-seven in number, whose population, before another generation passes, will probably be equal to that of our Europe, and what do we see? We see a vast, all but boundless, brotherhood of peoples, whose peaceful relations shall never more be disturbed even by 'rumours of war'—never embittered by the wars of tariffs, or embarrassed by the complications of commercial treaties,—no tolls upon their rivers, no custom-house or office for passports on their frontiers. The native of Boston is at home at New Orleans. The citizen of New York, on the sea-board of the Atlantic, is at home in San Francisco beside the Pacific Ocean.

With such a bright example before our eyes, of the immense benefits of the con-

federate system, need we shrink from inaugurating the policy—the bold and pregnant policy,—suggesting 'The United States of Europe'? Remembering for how long it was the pride and boast of England that she was the first to present to the whole Continent the exemplar of a constitutional, representative government—of the government of a people for the people and by the people—would it not well become her now to be the first and the most ardent in pressing this grand scheme upon the Nations? But to do that effectually, we must in the first place 'set our own house in order.' And here comes, most opportunely, to arouse and fix our attention, the cry of '*Home Rule*' from Ireland.

CHAPTER II.

Home Rule not a mere Irish Question : it is Scotch, English, and Imperial—Two Misguiding Assumptions to be set aside—Home Rule for Ireland does not mean Separation of Ireland from England or Catholic Ascendancy in Ireland—The most reliable Utterances of its Irish Advocates—The 'Father of Federalism in Ireland'—The Voice of the Irish Catholic Clergy—That Church essentially Conservative—Absurdity of the Threat of 'Civil War' to frighten the Public from a calm consideration of the Question.



HE people of this country should carefully beware of the misleading supposition that *Home Rule* is a mere Irish question. We shall make it plain to them it is a Scotch and an English question as well ; nay more, a vital imperial question. In further-

ance of the views of this essay, we, of course, will have to go further still; and we hope to prove it to be a grand European question,—a question of world-wide interest; and yet, with all that vast importance clinging to it, clearly solvable upon the plainest principles. In approaching this question, it will be prudent, if we would pronounce upon it calmly, to banish from our minds two misguiding assumptions: the 1st, that Home Rule means separation of Ireland from England, or Catholic ascendancy in Ireland; the 2nd, mischievously misguiding, that, no matter what it means, English interests require it to be resisted 'even at the risk of civil war' (the foolish threat of a Cabinet Minister).

We have been at some pains to ascertain the most authentic, the steadiest, and most persistent utterances of the leading advocates of Home Rule in Ireland. And we find them to be the utterances of the rev. gentleman,

very truly called, as will be seen presently, 'The Father of Federalism in Ireland,' Father Thaddeus O'Malley. We have obtained copies of his pamphlets and speeches on this head, and shall use them freely, and, we feel assured, with his full assent, as advancing his own views. We have now before us his first '*Federalist;*' he published three pamphlets with that title. It is dated just forty years ago, 'Dublin, 1831,' and appeared at the time that O'Connell, in his first agitation on the measure, was, as it were, running away with the question of Repeal of the Union.

In it we find this passage :—

'The reflecting politician, and the thinking patriot, say, and well and truly say, "If you repeal the Union simply, you will then have two sovereign legislatures, an *imperium in imperio*, without any key-note of harmony between them. You will have the English Parliament voting war supplies, and the Irish

Parliament rejecting them; you will have the English Parliament choosing one regent, the Irish Parliament another; you will have the English Parliament pursuing one course of commercial policy, whether foreign or international, and the Irish Parliament the very opposite; in short, you will have endless collisions, which, even without your wishing it, or intending it, must result eventually in a separation." To this the *religionist*, whether Protestant, Presbyterian, or Catholic (for it concerns them all alike), who is anxious for the security of freedom of conscience, will subjoin, and truly still:—"If you establish an unrestricted omnipotent legislature in a country like this, where so large a portion of the component elements of the body politic, namely, the constituency, is, and must be, Catholic, do you not expose yourselves to some risk, to say the least, of an ascendancy of some kind or other, no matter how

mitigated, being asserted and acquired by that class of Christians over all the others? It is in vain that the most enlightened of the Catholics themselves assure us that they would be as hostile as anybody to such a measure; who doubts that they would? for will it not still be possible, in their despite and ours, for a bigoted or designing faction, aided by the suffrages of the people, to obtain such a mastery in the Lower House as would enable them to imitate, step by step, both in its progress and in its issue, the march of usurpation and of violence of the Puritan faction of England in the seventeenth century?" Such are the really serious objections to which I am about to address myself, and, from my manner of stating them, it is clear that I am fully aware of their importance, and not at all disposed to blink or to evade them. In all truth and honesty, I am animated with the most sincere and anxious desire to

prevent those two results alluded to, as to be apprehended from a Repeal; and, it is only because I am convinced profoundly that the scheme of Repeal which I propose is the surest preventative of all, that I am deeply solicitous it should obtain some hold of the public mind *before it becomes entirely pre-occupied with the idea of an unconditional Repeal.*'

And again, the same year, in his second '*Federalist*,' we read:—'Indeed, two sovereign legislatures, in the same empire, without any lines of demarcation for either to keep it in its own track, and prevent it from straying into that of the other, or any points of contact, where they may touch, without conflicting, *was* a political anomaly that could not long endure. They were like wandering comets, without any fixed orbit, liable at every moment to knock their heads together, and set the world on fire! A single executive,

guiding the march of two independent legislatures, is something like the process of riding two horses, with a foot on each! *Ducrow* might do this with two well-trained Arabians upon an even arena—I doubt, however, whether he would venture the experiment with ordinary hacks, upon an ordinary road. But to take another view—Is it fair, I would ask, apart from all considerations of the danger and the absurdity, that Ireland should claim an *equal* share in the management of purely Imperial concerns? Is not England the *nucleus* of the Empire, and, as such, has she not a right to a preponderating influence in directing the course of its affairs? Now, if we were to place our Parliament upon the footing of '82, by a simple repeal of the Union, we would deprive England of this legitimate influence, and unfairly claim for ourselves, the smaller partner in the concern, an absolute and overbearing veto in the most

important transactions of the firm. For my part, I must say, that in the very same spirit of inexorable justice in which I demand from England the full measure of my country's rights, I am prepared to concede to England the full measure of her rights too.'

In '43, in his admirable and exhaustive speech in *Conciliation Hall*, in presence of O'Connell, we find this passage, 'We are not, like Canada, a distant colony. We are not a distant colony, we are not a colony at all, we are a kingdom, a co-equal member of a family of kingdoms, constituting a great empire. We must have our share of the management of the family affairs; we must not deprive ourselves of our fair portion of the profits of that management, and leave it all to be reaped by our sisters, England and Scotland; and here I allude not merely to paltry pecuniary profits, but also to the higher profits to which noble ambition aspires—

fame and honour. If we shut ourselves out altogether from the imperial circle, by a sole isolated Irish legislature, we leave no field open where the loftier spirits of our land, our Burkes and Cannings, may meet and commingle with those of the sister countries, and where the pre-eminent intelligence, which could sway with best effect the imperial sceptre, may have an opportunity of inspiring the imperial representatives with a full conviction of his superiority, and raising himself by their suffrage to the highest and brightest pinnacle of a freeman's legitimate ambition—the first minister of a great and a free people. I am surely no separatist. So far from dismembering the Empire, I only seek to infuse fresh life into its old limbs, and give it a new and interminable lease of increased renovated power.'

And finally, in the March of this year, 1871, we find the same firm voice repeating at

the Home Rule Association: 'Every sensible Irishman, who is free from crotchets, and who is not carried away by high-sounding platitudes, can easily see that it is our interest, our indisputable interest, in many ways, to remain closely united with England, provided always that it shall be upon terms of perfect equality. But that the Federal plan only can do, and that the Federal plan does completely.

We rely, and demand the full reliance of our English readers, upon this remarkably consistent utterance of Mr. O'Malley, and all the more especially as it is the voice of a Roman Catholic priest, who may be surely taken as speaking the sentiments of his order in Ireland, on the subject of Home Rule. And here, we may add, still further strengthening that reliance, that the Catholic Church is essentially, instinctively *Conservative*, not certainly in the party sense of the word, but in the sense that she is strongly opposed to any convulsive or revolutionary process of reform.

And now as to that other notion—the 'civil war' threatened so foolishly, not at the other side of the water, but at this—it is alike detestable and absurd. Suppose, as the result of a fair, constitutional agitation of the question, a decided majority of the Irish representatives should demand a re-construction of the political relations of these countries upon a sound federal basis, what right would this Government have to refuse? None but the right of force. A war undertaken to resist that demand would be anything but popular, even in this country. The great bulk of this sensible English people would regard it as a war inspired by the despotic spirit of our dominant ruling classes, by Ministerial pride, and bureaucratic arrogance. In Ireland it would be fairly held to be a war of aggression, which would be boldly and firmly encountered. It would not be now the petty insurrection of a county, which cost us

so heavily in blood and treasure in '98, and which we found so hard to put down, even with the aid of Brunswickers and Hessians—not available now. It would be a wide national revolutionary war, putting the whole country upon its mettle; and we are not ignorant what sort of mettle that is; and we should scout the idea that the Protestants of Ulster would be recreants to such a cause. They would have got, by that time, to be ashamed of their present rather childish dread of such a harmless *bête noir* (or bête *rouge*) as poor Cardinal Cullen, and would have found, in the provisions of a formulated Federal Act, abundant guarantees making a Catholic ascendancy in Ireland impossible. In such a war the whole organised force of the country would be against us. Every Irish policeman, whether of the blue coat or the green, every Irish soldier, either of the militia or the line, would be easily persuaded

that his first allegiance was to his country, the second to the Crown. In every such case so it always has been, and so it ever must be. In such a war the sympathies of all Europe and of America would be against us, whilst from all quarters, very probably, and certainly from France and from the States, crowds of disciplined soldiers and enthusiastic auxiliaries would find their way to the Irish camp in spite of all our fleets. And all the time, the strong Irish element in England, and dispersed over the whole face of the country, would be in a position to disturb and derange—almost to paralyse—any great military movements at this side the Channel. We shall not apologise for this plain speaking. We adopt it advisedly, and with the purest motive; solely with the view of our going into the consideration of the grand question before us with minds disengaged. And so prepared, let us now take up the case of Home Rule for Ireland.

CHAPTER III.

Case of Home Rule for Ireland—Difficulties in the Management of the Weightiest Affairs of the Country—No real Government in the Country—The race of the 'Shave-beggar' Chief Secretaries not extinct—Conduct of the Government in the Potato famine in Ireland, and the Cotton famine in England—The Unprecedented Absenteeism of Ireland, Home Rule the only cure, 'twill bring back the Absentees, or buy and sell their Estates—The chief Gravamen, the Absence of the *sentiment* of Independence and Self-rule—The Scotch case for Home Rule is much the same as Ireland's—Its essential Difference from England in its Laws, Judicature, and Jurisprudence—The English case—Fox's Warning—Plunket and the 'Six Acts'—Danger of the Irish Vote in Matters purely English—The Imperial case—The Federal Re-construction the best Security for all.



HE advocates of Home Rule for Ireland complain that no measure of improvement in that country, requiring an Act of Parliament, can be

carried without a vast deal of trouble and expense, and a very damaging incertitude consequent upon its having to be dealt with in London by a committee of members of either House of Parliament, or rather, and most absurdly, by committees of both Houses taking up the measure, one after the other, inflicting over again the same trouble and expense and incertitude,—both these committees comprised of members who, in most cases, and for the greater part, are incompetent to deal with, or heedless and indifferent about, the matter in hand. This, they allege, is a grievance of constant, of every-day occurrence, seriously affecting the great paramount interests of the country, and seriously impeding the free action of its Municipal Councils. The Railway Boards, for instance, cannot take the least step, the municipalities cannot venture upon any useful enterprise, such as water-works or

drainage works, without running the risks of that formidable Parliamentary campaign. And, we are even assured, what indeed on the face of it is probable enough, that the Parliamentary expense often exceeds the cost of the work to be done.

They complain that there is no real Government in the country, only a sort of bastard Cæsarism—an imbecile and vacillating regime,—never daring to grapple vigorously with its worst afflictions. They point to the atrocities of the insane Orange riots, the regular annual recurrence of which is so deeply disgraceful to British rule, and shocks and scandalizes every Government in Europe; and they say that a real Irish Government, sustained by a pure Irish Parliament—where the sane men of Ulster themselves would be fully represented—would squelch, as an elephant would a rat, that abominable saturnalia in the very first year of office,

and to the infinite satisfaction of all parties, including even the common-sense people of the very Orange Clubs.

They point further to the agrarian outrages in Meath and Westmeath, and elsewhere, which we saw the other day were made the excuse for a suspension of the *Habeas Corpus*, the feeble resource of feeble Governments('any one could govern with a state of siege'), and they insist that a strong Irish Government would easily put them down with the firm and strong hand,—a vigorous and fearless administration of the common law of the land. By the way, what a curious light is thrown upon this part of the case by that strange avowal of the Marquis of Hartington, in his speech in the House of Commons (27th Feb.), when introducing that very suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* for those counties. He bespeaks the indulgence of the House upon this

ground: 'the inexperience and want of acquaintance with Irish affairs which I labour under.' Here is the head executive officer of the country, its Chief Secretary and Cabinet Minister, himself the heir of vast estates in it, confessing his ignorance of its affairs—he is a mere tyro in Irish matters, and is sent to Dublin to learn his first lesson! These are the sort of Secretaries that O'Connell used to designate, in his rough word-painting, by the terse though rude sobriquet of *Shave-beggars*. And is not the indignity implied in sending such 'beggars' to the sister country—an indignity offered her repeatedly—well calculated indeed to spur on the zeal of the Irish Home Rule advocates?

The Irish Home Rulers lay much stress, as well indeed they may, upon the contrast between the conduct of the English Government in the Potato Famine, in Ireland, and

the Cotton Famine in England. In the former this English Government, to its ineffaceable disgrace and shame, suffered, in cold blood, some hundred thousand human beings to perish by a shocking death, victims to the blind idolatry of an atrocious political economy; whilst in the latter, by a prompt exceptional legislation, bidding that economy defiance, not only was not one life lost, but not one serious hardship endured.

Again they point, and here we would say with irresistible force, to that ever-present and ruinously prolific evil of Ireland—absenteeism,—an absenteeism such as no other country in the world is afflicted with. And here we cannot refrain from quoting this vivid sketch of that absenteeism so admirably drawn by Mr. O'Malley in his first *Federalist*:—

'. . . An absenteeism which is not the outgo merely of our gentry and our

nobles, but the necessarily consequent outgo of a vast proportion of the natural capital of the country: its wealth, its industry, its energy, its enterprise, its intelligence, its genius, and its courage. An absenteeism which, like a political hæmorrhage, is drawing fast out, in continuous torrents, the very heart's-blood of the body politic of Ireland, and which must leave it ere long—nay, has almost left it already—a lifeless corpse upon the great western shore, whose symptoms of vitality are scarcely better than the unseemly contortions of a political galvanism! An absenteeism, in fine, which is the utter extinction of the light and glory of our country, by conjuring away from her bosom, as if by some dark spell of her evil genius, all those of her children whose brow is illumined with the halo of fame, whether in arts, or in arms, in wit, in

beauty, or in song—so that what our patriot bard has so well said of a distinguished Irishman and his false English friends, may truly be said of Ireland now, and addressed to England herself, "She first feeds on her brains, and then leaves her to die."'

This absenteeism in its simple fiscal aspect represents an annual loss to Ireland, according to trustworthy calculations, of close on £3,000,000. Of course, with an independent Parliament, sitting in Dublin, having the complete and absolute control of all purely Irish affairs, a great many of the owners of these three millions would be sure to return to look after their own interests. And then, to meet the case of those absentees who hold estates in both countries, and who could not well be in two places at the same time, as well as to put the axe to the very root of absenteeism, 'twould be

competent to the Irish Parliament, and a perfectly legitimate exercise of its powers, according to our present most 'approved good master' in politics, Mr. Stuart Mill, to buy up at its current value every acre of those estates of absentees, whether individuals or corporations, and sell them at a fair price—a great part, let us suppose, in large lots to men in a position to fulfil those *duties* of property now so shamelessly neglected by their foreign owners, and the rest in smaller lots, with a view to the creation or the extension of that valuable class, sadly fading away in this country, a sturdy and independent yeomanry.

As a minor grievance, very insignificant indeed in comparison with the foregoing, the Irish Home Rulers complain of the wrong done to the Irish peerage in reducing them to the rank of Commoners in England, only allowing a small batch of them to sit in the

Upper House of Parliament, merely as representative peers, and even doing that so clumsily as to make them represent one opinion only. But the real gravamen of gravamens, what is in their eyes and for their country the *fons et origo omnium malorum*, is: that the absence of Home Rule takes away with it that *sentiment* of national independence which is to a country what that of personal independence is to the man, and which inspires a certain dignity and thoughtfulness—a gravity of the whole bearing,—chastened and quickened with a just feeling of self-reliance, the moral value of which is really inappreciable. They insist that a people not governing themselves are *slaves*, and they contrast the unthinking recklessness of slaves, of whatever clime or whatever condition of slavery, with the steadiness and forecast of freemen; but, they add, the Irish never were, never will, nor never can be *contented* slaves.

The soul of the country, they swear, is not yet dead, and that true nationality, which their own immortal Burke defines 'a spiritual essence,' must be imperishable. They chafe at the idea of Ireland acting the poor part of Teucer to the Ajax of England, skulking beneath her shield for protection, believing that the attractive character of the ever chivalrous Diomede would suit her better; and they are indignant, and truly with too much cause, at seeing their poor country made always the *buffo* in the international concert, and a perpetual butt for the ridicule, contempt, and scorn of all our comic journals and of too many of our serious ones too; and they demand all the louder as the one only sure redress, Home Rule, with the self-respect it will inspire in Ireland and the outward respect it will impose on England.

We will here interpose a moment to make a reflection on our own account, and regard-

ing the matter with mere English eyes. Seeking carefully into the case of Ireland, and studying the character of its people, we have noticed an obvious distrust and disrelish for the law pervading the great bulk of the humbler classes in Ireland, and a certain antipathy to all its agents. They are not surely what we would call a law-abiding population, and yet, according to the testimony of a very impartial and competent witness, the English Attorney-General in Ireland at a critical period, Sir John Davis, there is not a more *justice*-loving people in the world than the Irish. How are we to understand this apparent contradiction? It is simple enough. In their eyes, this law is not a Home-made law, it is the law of the foreigner. It is not a law freely accepted, but a law imposed. It is a law to which they owe no moral obedience, and which, like a mere fiscal enactment, they are free to

disregard at their peril. This sort of feeling, so strikingly evinced by recent occurrences in Dublin, pervading a whole people, is a very serious matter indeed, inasmuch as it actually makes impossible an efficient and wholesome government of the country. It is a subject for the gravest consideration of our statesmen, and we would respectfully, but most earnestly suggest to them, that there can be no other way out of the difficulty than granting the demand of Home Rule for Ireland.

What sheer nonsense it is, even though uttered by a Gladstone, to affect to meet this strong Irish case, by telling us that Ireland can ask nothing now which England is not ready to concede; the real grievance being that Ireland should have to *ask* at all —ask anything from England that she can better give herself. And, equally absurd is the nonsense of the notion, that to the Irish

Members of Parliament should be left the management of Irish affairs, as if they could not manage their home affairs much better at home, in the midst of all the surroundings, throwing their full light upon them, and wholly out of the reach of the 'meddling and muddling' of our English presumptuousness, which believes so confidently it can manage everything for everybody better than themselves. We have dwelt thus at length on the Irish case of Home Rule as it is, necessarily, the most urgent; let us now take a glance at the case of Home Rule for Scotland.

In a minor degree, most of the grievances affecting Ireland, from the absence of self-government, may be traced in Scotland.

The Scotch, in their legislative relations with England, are in some respects worse circumstanced than the Irish. Their laws, whether statute law or common law, are far

more different from those of England than the Irish, and yet, in repealing these laws or amending them, or even sometimes interpreting them in the last resort, they have far less influence. The statute book of Scotland is a *terra incognita* to our best English or Irish lawyers; nay, when the daily routine and the stalest forms of its judicature are so many mysteries to them, what must they be to our House of Commons? We assert, that in several points of the deepest moment, intimately connected with the national jurisprudence, Scotland is without sufficient constitutional guarantee, and that she is subjected to the discretion of a single man, in whose appointment she has almost as little concern as if he were to be in no way concerned about her! The voice of my Lord Advocate in the Imperial Parliament is absolute and decisive. Neither the *Palmers* nor the *Harcourts* will venture to

question an opinion which they cannot comprehend.

Besides this peculiarity, Scotland is exposed, in a certain measure, by her legislative union with England, to the same inconveniences to which the Irish are by theirs. It occasions the absenteeism of those of her sons whose constant presence would tend most to give her new life and vigour, and it tears them from her bosom to serve no purpose of hers; degrading her ancient and illustrious nobility to the level of commoners—permitting indeed by special courtesy some sixteen of them to mingle in the array of England's Peers, to feed the pride of the one with the prospect of the other's debasement; and sending forth, by a sort of 'single and double compound' process, some 'three and fifty' of her commoners to fight the 'sham battle' of Scotland with some five hundred English-

men on the floor of Westminster, where they have as much chance of gaining their cause, however right, if English selfishness makes it wrong, as the *avvocato del Diavolo* in a Roman process!

In sober earnest, is not the Scotch representation in either House of Parliament a mere show? In what way can it serve any purpose of an effectual control, when there is question of the honour or of the interests of Scotland? Suppose her threatened in what she holds most sacred, her Church government, what solid constitutional assurance has she for its protection? She may appeal to the Act of Union. But what security did the Irish Act of Union give to the Irish Church?—just none at all. Let Scotland's nobles, then, and Scotland's gentlemen, and Scotland's burghers, re-organize their old Parliament in Holyrood House, taking Scotland's own business into Scotland's own

hands, and shedding a new eclat on 'Auld Reekie's' brow, from the brilliant concentration of the national majesty. Let Scotland's only law, within Scotland's bounds, be, the accordant voice of her Peers and her Commons, confirmed by the Queen through her representative; and for the regulation of her relations with the sister kingdoms of England and Ireland, let her send forth an equal number of her Peers, chosen by those Peers, and a proportionate number of her Commons, chosen by those Commons, to meet an equal number of the Peers, and a proportionate number of the Commons of England and Ireland, similarly chosen, to constitute, by their union, an Imperial or Federal Legislature, having supreme jurisdiction, and in immediate communication with the Queen.

But is there really any such thing as a case for English Home Rule? Let us see.

Charles James Fox, denouncing the project of the Irish legislative union, warned his countrymen of the risk they incurred by it of deranging the normal action of their Parliamentary system by the intrusion of the foreign element of the Irish vote. And full soon was the accuracy of this warning laid bare. England would do well to remember the history of the famous six Acts, by which, in 1819, her public liberties were so roughly handled, her most sacred rights so rudely invaded. Who was the sponsor of those Acts in the House of Commons, and mainly helped to carry them by his eloquence and his influence? 'Twas an Irishman, a legislator for whom they were indebted to the Union, and who was quite out of the reach of any responsibility to them. 'Twas Plunket, and Irish eloquence, and Irish votes, that braved the storm from which Englishmen shrunk. Englishmen, take no-

tice—what has happened before may happen again. But has not something like this already happened since then? Has not something still more conclusive than this taken place within the memory of most of us? Is it not certain that during the latter years, if not the whole period, of the Melbourne Administration, England was governed by Ireland? We can ourselves well call to mind the Conservative organs of that day repeatedly analysing the votes of the House, and demonstrating by the analysis the uncomfortable fact that the destinies of England were in the keeping of a few Irish members. And so it must be always when there happens to be a nice balance of parties—a state of things which, in such a government as ours, must be of constant occurrence. Nay, more, at this very moment, as Mr. Newdegate apprised his constituents a few days ago, this very occur-

rence has arisen in its very worst aspect. And here is that great vital question, a question so precious in the eyes of most Englishmen—the question of the National Church of England,—about to be disposed of by men in no wise interested in it—by men not only indifferent, but hostile,—by the indignant, possibly vindictive, Irish *disestablished* Protestant, by the intolerant, almost fanatical Scotch Presbyterian. And thus is England herself exposed to the mischiefs, the inevitable mischiefs of our absurd system of concentrated legislation.

It now remains for us to show how far this question of Home Rule becomes a question of Imperial interest. Looking at the proposed method of remodelling the legislative union of the three countries, without any reference at all to the special grievances of any one of them, we would boldly put it to any reasoning mind, whether

it would not be, considered purely in itself, a most important step in advance in sound legislation and good government. To what is it mainly owing that these countries have so far excelled other nations in every branch of manufacture in which they have engaged —is it not to the rigorous application of the principle, *Division of Labour?* Is it not that same principle that has produced the extraordinary development of all the arts and sciences by which this age is so prominently distinguished? Why then should we except from its application the noblest of all manufactures—the manufacture of laws; the noblest of all arts—the art of governing; the noblest of all sciences—the science of jurisprudence?

We employ about a dozen men in the manufacture of a pin, but we employ one and the same Parliament in the deepest concerns of a vast empire and the little paltry minutiæ

of a turnpike bill! It is like driving home a tiny brass nail with a Nasmyth sledge-hammer. Any candid man, who takes the slightest notice of the actual working of our Imperial Parliament, must admit that it is physically impossible for that one House to do all its work well. And what is the necessary result? This of course—that never was there a Legislature in any country made so many blunders. Throw your eye along the statute-book, and you will find no title so frequent as this, 'An Act to Amend an Act.' It is not so much the great mass of the business this one House has to deal with that makes their task difficult, as it is its endless complexity and variety. The private bills alone, to mature them well, would nearly occupy the whole session. And just note how absurdly those private bills are disposed of. A so-called *private* bill is frequently of a very extensive public

importance. But it is actually made to depend upon the cast of a die whether the most important shall be taken up before the most insignificant, or whether it shall be taken up at all. It is a fearful scramble for an independent member to get any sort of measure into the House,—a downright Herculean labour to pass it through. But besides these private bills, this one House has the business of a Colonial Empire, distributed through all the quarters of the globe; the business of an Indian Empire, embracing a population of 150 millions; and, as an insignificant make-weight, the affairs of a domestic population of nearly thirty millions, to attend to at the same time!

Nor is it the magnitude of our home population, confining ourselves now to that, which makes the duties of our legislators so onerous, as it is the seriously important cir-

cumstance of its not being, like that of France, a homogeneous population. It is three distinct populations, having each as distinctly marked a national idiosyncrasy as any three nations of Europe—differing in all those traits which make up the character of a people,—differing in their wants, their tastes, their habits, their manners, their physical temperament and qualities of mind, and, unfortunately, in the most prolific item of all, differing in religion. Look at the explicit Parliamentary admission of this great fact. How few of the Acts of this united legislature have reference to the whole of these *united* peoples? Are they not as rare as black swans? We have an English Act to-day, an Irish Act to-morrow, and a Scotch Act the day after. They do not legislate in France in this fashion for Normandy, and Burgundy, and Gascony. We may be told that by a continuous

process of sound legislation, the three countries may be as thoroughly amalgamated as these provinces of France. We do not believe it. We believe the eternal law of Providence has pronounced otherwise, and what God has sundered it were not prudent for man to attempt to join too closely No tinkering then, we would say, can meet this case, such as marshalling the mob of Members of the Imperial Parliament into General Committees, representing the three nationalities, giving each full latitude to *discuss* its measures, but no power to carry one of them, the resolution of each being subject, of course, to be over-ruled by the others; for it would be too absurd to let a fragment of a Parliament make an Act of Parliament; so that this clumsy attempt to escape the present confusion would only serve to make the 'confusion worse confounded.' Let us pass on then to the

consideration of the only true remedy—the complete reconstruction of the political relations of the three countries upon the solid basis of a Federal Union.

CHAPTER IV.

Federalism, as Applicable to those Countries—No step Backwards—Canning's Antithesis—General Sketch of the American System, its Origin and Probable Destiny—More Firmly Established now than Ever—the 'Bubble not Burst'—Ugly Presentiments of English Statesmen touching the Slave-holders Rebellion—Mr. Gladstone—De Tocqueville—None of his Misgivings about the Republic, borne out by Events—Slavery—The Grand Act of Emancipation, 15th Amendment—Notice of the Scandalous Mis-government of New York—Misconduct of the Irish therein—Strong Appeal to the Irish Catholic Clergy in that City.



NTERING upon the discussion of Federalism as applicable to those countries, let us, in the first place, dismiss the idea that it would be a step backwards. 'When Canning exclaimed,—

Repeal the Union—restore the Heptarchy,—he deemed he had given the question, by his smart antithesis, its *coup de grace.* But, sir, we may repeal the Union without going back to the Heptarchy, or to our own Pentarchy either. We may repeal the Union without going back at all, but by taking, on the contrary, a great step in advance, and a step, too, in exact time with the natural progress of things. All political governments were in their origin fragmentary—sectional; having for their field of action a single city or town with some scanty territory around it. That was the first essay. The second was a consolidation of these little states into one, in which the more minute accuracy of the municipal or sectional government was compensated by the greater strength and security of the consolidated. The third and highest essay is that we are about to try—the Federal government,

which unites the advantages of both the others. Federalism is, therefore, the acmè in the science of government; it is the eclecticism of political philosophy. And is there not really something magnificent and sublime in its world-wide expansiveness?' Such was the utterance of Father O'Malley, in '43, and we all know what advances Federalism has made since then—we see it now imported from America and firmly established in the very centre of Europe.

To arrive at a sound conclusion on this grave matter, we have three very pertinent examples before us to guide us safely on:—the first and the most complete example of the Federal Republic of the United States, which De Tocqueville has pronounced to be 'the most perfect Federal Constitution that ever existed;' the second, the less complete example of the German Federal Monarchy;

and the third, the very incomplete, but yet good-warning example of the Austrian Federal nondescript monarchy, with its two heads, like its own eagle—a federalism still involved in the confusion of a painful construction, with all its loose scaffolding about it.

Before going into a detailed application of the American Federation, it may be expedient to give our readers a general sketch of that system, and a brief notice of the circumstances out of which it arose. When the independence of the Confederated States of America was triumphantly established towards the close of '82, those States consisted of thirteen, each and all in the enjoyment and the exercise of a supreme, unrestricted sovereignty, and held together by as slender a federal *cordon* as may well be conceived. They sent delegates to Philadelphia, to *consult* together upon the

common good; but their acts had no sort of legislative force, and were subject to the revision of each and all the separate state legislatures, before they could be enforced as law in the different sections of the Union. During the external pressure of the revolutionary war, this bond of union, slender as it was, helped to bind most of the States together in a generous co-operation—we say most of them, because there were some who meanly played truant to the cause, availing themselves of the slight hold which the confederation had upon them. But as soon as that external pressure was withdrawn, and peace and security smiled upon them, we find these triumphant States falling rapidly together by the ears, and from the endless collisions of their separate and unharmonised legislatures, we find rapidly resulting so much weakness and disorder from within, and so much distrust and contempt from

without, as reduced them, in a very few years, to the very verge of ruin!

In this predicament, what was the conduct of the States? Assembled in convention in the year '87, for the purpose of devising the best means of remedying the evils that oppressed them, what was the resolution that they formed? Was it to extinguish those conflicting state legislatures, and substitute a single imperial one in their stead? Was it a *legislative union* they thought of? No such thing. Undismayed by the idle horror of theories, and yet unseduced by mere theory alone, they ventured, in a happy hour upon new and unbroken ground, and they did so venture only so far as the clear light of common sense, 'like the pillar of fire,' shone out steadily upon them. The constitution which they framed—the purest and the noblest political compact with which any portion of the human family has ever

yet been blessed—provides against the mischiefs which they had assembled to obviate after this manner—and it is a manner that is at once extremely simple and profoundly wise.

It recognises the sovereignty of each state legislature in all matters whatsoever of purely domestic concern. This state legisture, as well as the imperial one, consists of three branches—a house of representatives, a senate, and a governor, with a modified veto; all the creations of the elective principle, and springing immediately from the people;—each State having its own Constitution, and its people retaining exclusively the power of modelling it at their pleasure.

But in the formation of the General Congressional Legislature, whose jurisdiction was to extend to all matters of common concern to all the States, or any two or more of them, as well as to all matters that may

grow out of their relations as a union with foreign States, the convention adopted a new principle of compound representation, by which not only the people of each State were to be represented in their elementary constituent character, but by which each State itself was to be represented as a co-equal member of the union. In accordance with this principle, the number of members sent directly by the people of each State to the House of Representatives of the General Congress, was to be in the direct ratio of its population, whilst, on the other hand, the number of the *senators*, who were to represent each State as a co-ordinate sovereignty in the Upper House of Congress, was to be in all cases equal, and was to be chosen not by the people of that State, but by its legislative bodies in joint sitting, as its constituted body politic.

Thus the people of the State of Virginia

sent ten members to the House of Representatives of the Congress, whilst the people of Rhode Island sent but one; but on the other hand the State of Rhode Island sent two senators to the Congressional Senate, and Virginia did no more. Thus also in the election of the third branch of the Congressional Legislature, the President—who like the governors enjoys but a modified veto,—the people of the States were to contribute in the proportion of their numbers, each having as many votes as they had representatives in the Lower House of Congress, and should they fail in giving any one candidate an absolute majority of the whole number of votes, the election was to devolve upon the States, which decided the choice by a simple majority.

Such was the Constitution—so far as concerns our purpose to review it,—by which the people of America sought to obviate the

inconvenience of their conflicting legislatures, and by which they did in effect reduce them all to sweet harmony upon the *minor* key.

Such was the Constitution whose practical working has so completely realised the sagacious expectations of its framers;—that the action and reaction of the separate governments, and of the general government upon each other, would be highly beneficial to both; and that whilst the general government would be a solid guarantee to the State ones, that they should not encroach upon each other, these in their turn, like so many moorings cast around it, would preserve that general government itself—like the sacred ark of their new political covenant,—firm and unmoved amidst the fiercest heavings of popular commotion from within, or the heaviest inundation of foreign aggression from without.

Here is a political system, absolutely new, and to this hour unique ; a system so simple in its principle, as to be out of the reach of corruption, and yet so compounded as to seem as if it could not stand together for a day ; a system in which so much unity and so much variety are so inseparably connected, the one constantly produced by the other, and the mutual relations proceeding from both, and uniting both, that it affords an admirable illustration of the Platonicean trinity : a system quite Newtonian, where the centre is fixed, and all the subordinate orbs are kept in their path, according to the laws of gravitation ; the principle of attraction being lodged in the General Congress, and the principle of repulsion in the State Legistures ;—a system, too, in which the centre (as it is, perhaps, with the sun in the planetary), receives, as in a point of concentration, the light and heat of the surrounding

planets, to distribute them then in its turn amongst them, according to nature's favourite principle of mutually giving and receiving—a system, in fine, all whose parts are so finely, and yet so firmly interlaced together, and the whole so securely based, and so nobly sustained, as to present the liveliest idea of graceful symmetry and solid strength —like a clustered composite column, whose magnificent capital throws its proud head up high into the heavens, and whose basis is a truncated pyramid, which widens as it descends, until it takes a deep, and wide, and firm grasp of the whole soil!

That grand system of government is growing every year more firmly consolidated. 'The bubble has *not* burst,' as too many of our ignobly jealous politicians so fondly flattered themselves a few years ago. That 'great Southern Confederation,' forsooth, that rank conspiracy of the slave-holding States,

based upon and cemented by the most abominable system of slavery the world was ever cursed with, that was the 'bubble' instead—the unholy dream of a narrow-minded statesmanship. We were on that occasion greatly shaken in our faith in the political sagacity of Mr. Gladstone and his large-hearted Christian philanthropy, when we saw him exhibiting a sickly sympathy in so vile a cause, and too plainly betraying his hope and wish that the foul rebellion was about to sunder in twain the grand Republic.

Let us glance for an instant at the probable destinies of this grand Republic. When you look at the map of the world, you see that the United States of America, including its territories—the regions not yet constituted as States,—and the later purchase from Russia, are even now much larger than all Europe. But as surely as in God's own mechanism smaller bodies are attracted

by larger, so by an irresistible social and political gravitation, all these surrounding regions, not being parted by any sea, and peopled by kindred races speaking the same language,—New Columbia, Upper and Lower Canada (the 'Dominion' notwithstanding), New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, with all their accessories, must inevitably, and at no distant period, be absorbed into the great Republic. Newfoundland, too, and all the islands, large or small, in the encompassing seas, and obviously within the sphere of attraction—the English, and Danish, and Dutch, and French, and Spanish,—all alike, will surely follow in due course, sooner or later. Thus will be borne out, upon the grandest scale the world has yet seen, that beneficent purpose which the Founders of the Republic emblazoned on the frontispiece of the Constitution, 'To ensure domestic tranquility.'

De Tocqueville was not only a shrewd observer on the spot, but also a very diligent student of the whole state of things in the United States, and even in his time, now some forty years ago, and with all the many and serious drawbacks since removed, he arrived at the conclusion, 'I hold it to be one of the combinations most favourable to the prosperity and freedom of man.' And, whilst laying it down 'as a general principle, that nothing is more opposed to the well-being and freedom of man than vast empires,' and whilst admitting 'that great States have peculiar advantages'—such as the undertaking great works and vast explorations, and extensive scientific investigations, and the like,—he yet strongly insists, 'but it is the especial merit of a well-constructed confederation of States that it secures both advantages, those of the small Kingdom and the great Empire;' and he

concludes, definitively, 'The Union is as happy and as free as a small people, and as strong as a great nation.'

'Twill be well to notice here, how completely the doubts and misgivings of De Tocqueville have all been swept away by subsequent events. He feared that the sentiment of patriotism would be enlisted more strongly for the State than for the Union. 'If the sovereignty of the Union were to engage in a struggle with that of the States, at the present day, its defeat may be confidently predicted.' How completely, how gloriously, has the late war belied that prediction! The strongest and best concentred Government in Europe would have been overwhelmed by such a rebellion as that of the slave-holding States. But the steady devotion to the Union of the great mass of the American people—east, north, and west, even of those most deeply imbued,

with State-rights sympathies,—was a match and an overmatch for the fierce encounter; and the Americans are now, more than ever, firmly, indissolubly attached to that Union —thoroughly conscious how unassailable it makes them at home, and what respect and deference it secures for them all the world over.

He was afraid they 'would find it easier to conquer with their armies than to make their armies live at peace after the conquest,' and he was 'of opinion that a restless and a turbulent spirit is an evil inherent in the very constitution of democratic armies, and beyond hope of cure.' How nobly have the Americans scattered to the winds these misgivings too! There is nothing in all history so admirable as the manner in which these gigantic armies, that crushed that tremendous rebellion, melted away rapidly into the civic population—every man resuming cheer-

fully his old avocation,—literally, one might truly say, turning their swords into ploughshares.

He distrusted the feebleness of the central power. But the necessities of the war have convinced the Americans of the expediency of strengthening it, and, notwithstanding their shrewd jealousies on that head, they have in latter years strengthened it considerably. And only last year the Congress passed a law by which the President is empowered—what he is this very moment doing,—to stretch out his strong arm into the very heart of that vixen State—the ever turbulent South Carolina,—and crush with the mailed hand that barbarous combination, with the barbarous nick-name, the Ku-klux-klan, madly venting the resentment of the defeats of the rebellion, and frightening from the polls the enfranchised slave, and his white friend, by every form of violence and

outrage upon the peaceable inhabitants, the whole country round.

He imagined the preponderance of the larger States might be dangerous to the smaller. But there never has been, from the formation of the Union to this day, even the slightest encroachment by one State upon another; and there sits in secure repose the little State of New Jersey by the side of her burly sister, the powerful State of New York, and the still smaller Delaware by the side of Pennsylvania.

De Tocqueville's chief misgiving had reference of course to *Slavery*. But we have all seen, with infinite satisfaction most of us, that deep stain upon the American escutcheon washed away for ever, and now in our own day that other foul blot *Mormonism* is about to disappear in its turn. How complete is that Act of Emancipation of the Slave, in that famous 15th Amendment of

the Constitution, bearing the memorable date, 31st May, 1870. It secures to the whole population of the United States, in every variety of election by the people, the free and full exercise of the franchise—the symbol and the weapon of freedom 'in every State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, without distinction of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude, any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State, or Territory, or by or under its authority to the contrary notwithstanding;' and it carefully and cautiously guards that precious freedom from all cavil and chicanery, by the most minute and searching provisions embodied in an admirably elaborated Act of twenty-three sections.

In holding up for our guidance in this grave discussion, the Constitution of the

United States, we thought it right to present it in its most truthful aspect. And, as recent occurrences in the great city of New York, which may be called the metropolis of the Union, are certainly of a nature to cast deep discredit upon the management of public affairs in that, the chief municipality in the whole country, it has occurred to us to offer a few observations tending to lessen, if not remove that undoubtedly very damaging disparagement.

New York, it ought to be borne in mind, is the refuge and rendezvous of all the roughs and ruffians of all Europe. They are the chief instruments which make possible that desperate misrule which has inundated the doomed city with such a flood of corruption as has astonished the whole world—a corruption of the very fountain in the franchise, and thence and thereby, a shameful corruption of the magistracy, the bench, and the bar.

Unhappily, a large share of this ruffianism, we fear the very largest share, has been contributed by these countries, and more especially, we are sorry to add, by Ireland. The poor Irish emigrants, upon their arrival in New York, utterly ignorant of the due working of its municipal institutions, and of the true character of the agents of corruption who seize upon them at the very moment of disembarking, and such easy victims, too, as their poverty makes them, to the seduction of a bribe, are the readiest and the cheapest instruments of that gigantic swindle in the empire city.

We have often thought that the Roman Catholic clergy in New York are very much to blame for the state of things here alluded to. The great bulk of these Irish emigrants are Catholics. A good many of these New York priests are Irishmen. Why do they not use their great influence and

authority—a use which in this case the whole world outside the 'Ring' would heartily approve, in rescuing their poor countrymen from this vile trade—the agency of swindlers,—which, while filling the pockets of the leaders, leaves the poor dupes nothing in the end but disgrace and shame. We fear very much, and this is in our eyes the ugliest feature of the whole case, that this high tide of corruption has actually forced its way into the very sanctuary of the Catholic Church in New York. The 'Tammany Ring,'—that is the well-known designation of the gang of swindlers who have usurped and so well *exploited* the municipality of New York—made large concessions of privileges, and large grants of money, to the Catholic schools of New York, in direct and flagrant violation of the principles of the United States school system. Mr. Tweed, the *facile princeps* of

the gang, cared very little, we may be sure, about Catholic education, and his gifts towards that may fairly be deemed, in the German meaning of the word, really moral *poisons* in the shape of bribes. If it is to these bribes are to be attributed the silence of the New York Catholic clergy in the midst of, and their constructive acquiescence in, these grossly demoralizing proceedings, occurring every day under their eyes, it is really a very unpleasant thing to think of.

We would implore our Catholic brother priests in New York, and more especially those who are Irish, to take this matter to heart. We have not the least idea of their mingling in the strife of parties, or of their showing, as a body, the slightest leaning on either side—the Republican or the Democratic. But here is a question of public morality not to be merged in the interests of any party, or any possible combination

of parties. There must be, surely, many honest men in both these parties in New York; and it appears there is now constituted a Reform party, consisting of those honest men, firmly bent upon applying a *radical* cure to that enormous scandal in their city. The Irish priests ought to go in for that reform with all heart and soul. They might, and they ought, open missions in the Irish quarters of the town, for the express purpose of enforcing the laws of morals and the higher commandments of religion in reference to the exercise of political rights, and the fulfilment of political duties; denouncing the *crimes* of buying or selling votes, of false personations of voters, with all the perjuries involved, of any form of chicanery or violence, disturbing the due manipulation of the voting process; of any act, in short, or any omission, tending even indirectly to vitiate or impair the pure and

complete administration of the FRANCHISE—that franchise which is the very corner-stone of the Temple of Liberty. It is only by such a process the seeds of corruption, *all still in the ground*, can be thoroughly eradicated. In this way these good Irish priests will most effectually discharge the double duty of the twofold allegiance they owe—their strict and punctual allegiance to their adopted country,—binding them to sustain, to the utmost of all their faculties, the honour of the Republic; and their sentimental allegiance to their mother country—pledging them to sustain the honour of Ireland in America, and to purify and exalt the character of Irishmen in the States, and restore it again to the proud eminence it had attained by their noble conduct in the war. And then, as to their schools, if they will insist on having exclusively Catholic schools, their honest course will be to rely on exclusively Catholic resources.

We respectfully submit these few remarks to the consideration of their very estimable Prelate, The Most Rev. Dr. M'Closkey, Archbishop of New York. And we trust that he and they will take them in good part, prompted as they are by a double interest on our part too—the deep interest we have always taken in the destinies of the great Republic, and the affectionate interest we feel in everything touching poor old Ireland, for we too, feel thrilling in our veins some Irish blood. We beg your pardon, gentle reader, for this rather long *en parenthese*, and now let us proceed.



CHAPTER V.

Exact Application, in Detail, of Federalism to the Three Countries (Scotland must come in)—The English House of Commons and of Lords—The Irish—The Scotch—The Third Estate for the English, the Irish, and Scotch Parliaments—The Administration, English, Irish, Scotch—The Executive, English, Irish, Scotch—The Imperial Parliament—Its Commons and Lords—The Imperial Administration—The Harmonious Action of those Bodies—The Securities for such Action—Constitution of United States—The Imperial Federal Judicature—The Federal Supreme Court.

COMING now to the direct and the more exact, and minute application of Federalism to these countries, we would ask, Is not Federalism as applicable to three states as to thirteen or thirty-seven? Is it not more easily applicable to a monarchy than to a republic?

To us it appears to be so, decidedly. If the principle of Federalism has worked so well, upon the whole, in the United States of America, in spite of the fierce war of opinion, growing out of conflicting interests, whether agricultural, or manufacturing, and mercantile, so constantly carried on between the Northern and Southern States, how much more smoothly would it not work in these three kingdoms, where the interests of all, upon these heads, is substantially the same. If the principle of Federalism has worked so well under a political system where the chief executive magistrate is comparatively feeble, where, tho' chief magistrate of the Union, he is *not* the chief magistrate in the States, or in any one of them, and where, whilst in his legislative capacity he constitutes the Third Estate in the Imperial Congress, though in a restricted sense, he is the Third Estate nowhere else, how much

more freely will it not work in these countries, where the chief executive, our gracious Queen, is much stronger in many ways, and where, in her legislative capacity, she will be the Third Estate, not of the Empire only, but also the Third Estate, at least by representation, in each of the three kingdoms composing it.

We hold fast to the idea of *three* nations in the federation we contemplate. For we are convinced that Scotland will fall in with the movement for Home Rule. She is thoroughly conscious that her affairs have been, and must continue to be, grossly neglected under the present system of concentrated legislation. And besides, we feel a sort of reverence for the quaint maxim, *omne trinum perfectum.* Arriving, then, at our special applications, we would propose that, under our Federal regime, the English House of Commons shall continue to be the

same body it is now, only *expurgated*, as Charles James Fox would express it, of the Irish and Scotch element. The English House of Lords would also be the same, only similarly simplified by the retirement of the Irish and Scotch Lords, and not the representative Lords only, but of every Irish and Scotch Peer, the bulk of whose property is not English. No lord should be entitled to sit in any two of the three Parliaments, but only in that of the country where his chief interests lie. The Irish House of Commons would consist, not of its present number of representatives, but, adding to it say ninety-five to their one hundred and five, 'twould give a House of two hundred members. We are aware that, at the time of the Union, it was three hundred, but it seems to us the lesser number would be better—more apt and competent for business. We dislike multitudinous representa-

tions; and that, we may add, is the prevalent feeling about them in most of the Governments on the Continent, and even in the United States. A multitude, even of *savans*, is very apt to be a mob. The Scotch House of Commons, bringing home from London their fifty-three members, and adding to them some ninety-seven, would be a compact business-like House of one hundred and fifty members. In those several elections that will be necessary for the construction of the new House of Commons in Scotland and in Ireland, 'twould be well to adopt the method of the electoral districts—a certain amount of population, forty or fifty thousand, as it may be, would have but one member assigned to them. That one the voters would have to select out of the candidates, and have no vote for any other. That will be a more direct—a simpler and a safer process,

and will prevent that sort of collusion and compromise between two candidates which often vitiates an election, making the private interfere with the public interest. The Scotch House of Lords, as well as the Irish House of Lords, would consist of purely Scotch and Irish Peers, that is, Peers having the bulk of their estates in either of those countries, inasmuch as it is that interest only gives them any title to be legislators at all.

And now, How shall we constitute the 'Third Estate' in each of these three countries? Would it be any violent revolutionary measure to make the Prince of Wales Lieutenant-General of England, including, of course, the Principality, competent, in his executive capacity, to put his name to every instrument requiring the Royal Sign-manual, and bearing upon purely English matters; and competent, in his

legislative capacity, to give the Royal assent to every Bill that shall have passed both Houses of the English Parliament? And then, for Scotland, there is Prince Alfred, already marked out for the like office by his very title of Duke of Edinburgh; and for Ireland, we have the other Prince, clearly destined by the double augury of both his auspicious names, Prince Arthur Patrick, to be Duke of Dublin, and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

What an immense amount of trouble that arrangement would save the poor Queen, and even on that account has it not some claim to the favourable consideration of all her loyal subjects? But what a capital application that would be of the fruitful principle, Division of Labour,—both in the administration and the legislation of the country. We should then have no Bruce, committing so many blunders, when he

would have only England to look after. And we should have no more of these complaints now constantly ringing in our ears, of the 'Collapse of the Legislature,' or the 'Dead-lock of Legislation,' or the 'Dead-lock of our Judicature,' by reason of a clumsy, unintelligible legislation.

Each country should, of course, have its separate Ministry for its separate administration, as well as its separate Parliament for its separate legislation. Let us suppose that ministry in England to be: The Lord Chancellor, to be President of the Council, a Chancellor of the Exchequer (to take charge of the Duchy of Lancaster), a Minister of Justice and Education, a Minister for Works, Manufactures, and Agriculture, a Home Secretary, or Secretary for England, a Post-master General for England, and, what we deem to be the most valuable Minister of them all, a Comptroller-General of the

Labour-market (we shall have much to say about this Administration in our next '*Harmony*'). In Ireland and Scotland we assume exactly the same administration, only in Scotland their chief Law Lord would take the place of the Lord Chancellor: and the Secretary of State, in each country, might be the Premier of its Ministry.

These several Administrations would be directly appointed by the several Governors-general, in pursuance of the normal constitutional action of Government by party, that is, in obedience to the rule of the majority in Parliament, so that we might have, without the slightest confusion or disorder, a Conservative Government in England, a Liberal Government in Ireland, and a Radical Government in Scotland. All this would be simply carrying out the very same system of government that is actually in full operation

in our colonies; 'twould be exactly what we witness in Victoria and Canada. The young Prince Alfred would soon be quite at home in his own beautiful Edinburgh—soon familiar with all the special affairs of bonnie Scotland, and surrounded by men upon whom he may fully rely for his personal guidance. And his younger brother, Prince Arthur Patrick, would be received in Ireland with a boundless enthusiasm, doubly endeared by the names of their great hero and their great saint; every man in Ireland will regard him as a personal friend, and we'll be bound for it every woman too, and with a fonder attachment, and besides his Private Secretary, who will be carefully chosen for him, he will have, in the Irish Privy Council, the direct nominees of the Crown—a body of men competent to guide him safely through any intricacy of affairs,—and not the least agreeable point of the

prospect before him, probably the ardent Ierne will soon offer him a bride, fairer, aye fairer even than Spenser's 'Fairy Queen.'

Possibly, this sketch of the initiatory process of our Federal regime may seem to be taken rather too much *en couleur de rose.* Let us take a harder view of the matter. Even Princes must die, and the Monarchy itself is not immortal. Now that royalty has lost completely its main prestige, as no one believes now in the 'Divine Right of Kings,' and has absolutely ceased to be a *power* in the State, and is really little better than a matter of parade—an imposing ceremony that no longer imposes,—the question begins very naturally to be asked, whether that parade is worth what it costs? For our part, we abide by the maxim, 'the Government best administered is best,' and do not feel called upon here to go into the inquiry of the comparative merits of republic and

monarchy. For under both alike our Federalism can flourish, and so, upon the demise, or the withdrawal, or the non-appointment of the Princes, in the Federal Act itself, the normal method of supplying the 'Third Estate' in each of the three countries, in our Federal regime, might be by the free election by ballot of the several Parliaments in joint sitting of both Houses, of a native nobleman for a fixed term of seven years. The Americans are finding out the inexpediency of re-electing their Presidents, and very probably the next amendment of the Constitution will be one to provide against it.

This is a departure from our American model, in two ways. There, the election of Governor of the State is by a popular election, and for a short term, generally two years. In this we venture to differ with De Tocqueville. He was favourably im-

pressed with the multiplicity of elections in the United States, believing them useful in maintaining in the body of the citizens, an active and energetic political vitality. But we are strongly of opinion there is out there rather 'too much of a good thing.' The sober-minded and sedate citizens—the men of regular business habits,—who are the best class of voters, are worried by this perpetual recurrence of elections, and too strongly tempted to stay away, and the result too often is, that the election falls into the hands of mere traders in politics—dishonest intriguers, whose least care is to put 'the right man in the right place.' Another clear advantage—a double and triple advantage,—of electing the 'Third Estate,' the Governor-General, by a vote of the two Houses instead of a general election, would be, that it would preclude all the turmoil, intemperance, angry denunciations, passionate or riotous meet-

ings, always consequent upon such elections and so dangerous to the public peace, and which, with all their toil and trouble, would not be at all likely to give us so good a choice as the quiet mode; that it could dispense with the necessity of a Vice-Governor, as the vacant chair could be so readily filled—and for any short interval of vacancy by the Speaker of the House of Commons; and that the same process by which the Governor was created might plainly be deemed adequate to supersede him, any sufficient cause arising; and thus would be obviated the tedious process of an Impeachment. But in removing the Governor, 'twould be well it should be by a two-thirds vote of the whole Commons, and a majority of all the Lords.

It remains for us now to see how we are to constitute our Federal *Imperial* Parliament. Remembering that it ought to be, so

to say, a Parliament of *specialities*, that is, of men most *au fait* in matters of trade and commerce of all branches, home and foreign, of military affairs, of colonial and diplomatic affairs, and very especially of the affairs of our vast Indian Empire, which, though at this moment in a very critical condition, as Dr. Hunter has shown in his very timely work, is utterly neglected by our present Parliament, because unfelt and unknown by most of its members—remembering all that, we will admit our Imperial Federal House of Commons need not be very numerous. Suppose it to consist of ninety English members, thirty Irish, and twenty Scotch—a House of one hundred and forty members. Suppose them elected for the same term as the national Parliaments, and elected by the Commons of these several Parliaments—by free vote by ballot. For greater convenience they might be elected in batches, at

different periods during the sessions of the National Parliaments—thus the English ninety, for example, in six batches of fifteen each. That arrangement would enable the members to make a more careful selection, and they might have, between the intervals, several weeks to look about them.

Here, too, we depart from our American model. There, the members of the House of Representatives, in the Congress, are chosen directly by the people, and there are special electoral districts assigned for the purpose. But we would submit, that the plan here suggested has considerable advantages. The members of the House of Commons of each National Parliament would be far better judges of, and have far better opportunities of judging maturely, the special aptitude of the men to be chosen, than any constituency out of doors. They are close observers, every day and every night, of the

tastes, and habits, and studies of their brother-members, and can form a sound opinion as to who is the best man—the most competent to deal with the several branches of the great interests to be disposed of in the Federal Imperial Parliament. Besides, there would be a great difficulty in marking out those electoral districts, which should be necessarily very different in each country, and inconveniently large in Scotland and Ireland. And, we may add, 'twill be clearly desirable to make the introduction of our Federal system as smooth as possible, and so to depart the least we can from our ordinary electoral habits. Another obvious advantage of taking the representatives in the Imperial Parliament out of the bodies of representatives in the National Parliaments, instead of electing a distinct class of representatives, will be, that the Home Parliament will not be deprived of the services of some

of its best men, who will betake themselves to the Imperial Council only when the national affairs shall have been disposed of. Nor would this add much, if at all, to the labour of our M.P.'s. The necessary effect of the division of Parliamentary labour, secured by this Federal arrangement, would be to shorten the Parliamentary sessions very considerably. Three months will probably suffice for the domestic business, and then the Irish and Scotch Imperialists will count it no hardship to run up to London for three or four weeks; and that not every year either, as it might be fairly a little item in our scheme, that the Imperial Parliament should meet from time to time in Dublin and Edinburgh.

And now as to our Imperial House of Lords: we have here to take especial notice that a perfect equality between the confederated countries is the essential, the vital

principle of Federalism. Adhering on this head to our American model, we submit that the number of Lords from each of the three nations constituting the Imperial Upper House must be exactly the same. The Irish and the Scotch Lord has just the same chance of being witty or wise as the English, and so he has the same title to come into the world a legislator. In their natural state these laborious lordlings, who in the droll phrase of Beaumarchais, 'give themselves the trouble to be born' (qui se donnent la peine de nâitre), show no indication of any right to counsel or command. Professor Huxley was so good as to assure us very recently, that he was not aware of any instance on record of any one of them coming into the world with a coronet on his brow or a pair of spurs on his heels. Taking them, therefore, to be all pretty equal, and bearing in mind that they are all alike the creations

of the Crown, it is surely no extreme suggestion to send up an equal number of the Lords of each country, say twenty-five, to constitute the Imperial House of Peers, not elected by the Lords only of each National Parliament, as in the case of the Commons, but by both Houses in joint sitting, as being not the representatives of their order merely, but the representatives of the whole country in its capacity of a co-ordinate sovereignty in the Federal Union.

The Imperial Administration might be:— A First Lord of the Treasury (the Premier), the President of the Imperial Peers, to be elected by them, and to be the President of the Council; also a Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretaries for War, for the Navy, for Home, for Foreign Affairs, for the Colonies, and for India, an Imperial Postmaster-General, and a President of the Board of Trade and Commerce. All these would be, of course,

appointed by the Queen, in obedience to the constitutional action of majorities, but in this action in our high Imperial Congress mere party will probably not much prevail, and what an advantage that will be, for how often has party spirit injuriously affected our Imperial interests.

The matter we have now to deal with is not the least important point of the great question in hand—namely, how best to secure the harmonious action of these several bodies, the Imperial and the National Parliaments. On this head we have, fortunately, the most satisfactory guidance in our great American model. What could be more complete or precise than these provisions of the '*Constitution*,' pointing out to the General Congress of the Union what it may do, and what it may not do; and to the legislative Assemblies of the States what they may do, and may not do?—'Section 8.—Congress

shall have power: 1st. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. 2nd. To borrow money on the credit of the United States. 3rd. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. 4th. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. 5th. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. 6th. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States. 7th. To establish post-offices and post-roads. 8th. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by

securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right of their respective writings and discoveries. 9th. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offences against the law of nations. 10th. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. 11th. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. 12th. To provide and maintain a navy. 13th. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 14th. To provide for the calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. 15th. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them

as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 16th. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever [in the small district of Columbia, the seat of the Government, embracing Washington and suburbs], and to exercise like authority over all places, purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other useful buildings; and, 17th. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.'

The whole wide field of legislation outside

these well-defined bounds—still more sharply marked out below,—is open to the State Legislatures. The following are the chief *restraining* clauses as affecting the Congress and the State Assemblies:—'Section 9—5th. No tax or duty shall be laid (by Congress), on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.' And, as affecting the States—Section 10—1st. 'No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or law imparing the obligation of *contracts*, or granting any title of nobility.

2nd. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage; keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; enter into any agreement or compact with another State or foreign Prince, or engage in war unless actually invaded or in such immediate danger as will not admit of delay.'

Amongst the generally *assuring* clauses we find these—1st. Amendment.—'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. And Art. 6, sect. 3.—No

religious tests shall be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. Art. 4, sect. 2.—1st. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. 2nd. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. Sect. 4—1st. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.'

With scarcely one exception, the whole *body of* these provisions, restrictions, and

assurances may be transferred into our great *Act of Federation*, simply changing *Congress* into *United Parliament*, *State* into *Kingdom*, and *republican form of government* into *monarchical form of government;* and he would be surely a very crotchety person indeed, who would not admit that here there is clearly abundant security against any collisions in our Federal system. And, for still further security, or rather for greater clearness, it might be well to embody in that Act a restraining provision to this effect:—None of the National Parliaments shall pass any Act upon Bankruptcy or other large measure of commercial law, or upon Marriage—as 'twould be obviously desirable to have the law upon these heads the same throughout the Empire,—none of these Parliaments shall enact any measure tending directly or indirectly to impair the freedom of commerce, home or foreign, the freedom

of conscience, or the freedom of education. And in case any doubts shall arise as to the import of any provisions of any such Act, it shall be competent to the Supreme Federal Court to define and confine the same in the strict constitutional sense.

We should like to see that eminent lawyer and leading champion of the Home Rule movement in Ireland, the member for Limerick (Mr. Butt), take up our whole scheme and reduce it into the form of a regular Act of Parliament, with the title 'An Act for a better construction of the political relations of the three Countries upon the basis of a Federal Union.'

What a blessed thing 'twould be if Ireland would at last settle down into permanent repose, and turn steadily to account the unshackled Home Rule here secured to her. And who can doubt but she will. For our part, we are full of hope soon to see that

fresh young Irish Parliament setting with a hearty will and steadfast purpose to the great task before it—the complete redemption of their country from all the wrongs and injuries of centuries of misrule. And what a curious and interesting coincidence it will be to see it reserved for the *Earl* Spencer to dissipate finally that dread of 'some secret scourge which shall by her (Ireland) come unto England' which clouded the vision of the *Poet* in his 'View of the State of Ireland' hundreds of years ago.

How many fruitful fields of sound useful legislation that young Parliament will have to cultivate—in improving their land laws by judicious provisions for the agricultural labourer, by amendments of their poor laws, by a reform of their grand jury system, by encouraging and sustaining, without any interference with free trade, the natural and suitable manufactures of the country, by

upholding, in like manner, their fisheries, richer than mines of minerals—by extending and *nationalizing* their railway traffic—and, certainly not the least valuable, by a complete elaboration of the scheme, hinted above, touching the sale of the estates of absentees. And in rendering all these most valuable services, they will be wholly unembarrassed by that difficulty which some people deem the *crux* of the Federal problem—the management of the military force of the country. The 14th and 15th 'Powers' of Congress (of our Federal Imperial Parliament), quoted above, removes that obstacle most satisfactorily. Pursuant to them, the Imperial Commander-in-Chief will hold well in hand the whole militia of Ireland, yet the Irish Government will appoint its officers. But, of course, Ireland will then have what England and Scotland have now, its corps of Volunteers, which, being a purely home

force, may fairly be left in the hands of the Home Government.

As the climax of the Federal Organization it remains for us now to notice the Federal Supreme Court. The Government of the United States needed, of course, a judicature of its own to deal with national affairs, such as matters affecting treaties with foreign States and their Ambassadors or other public Ministers, and cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the like; and, foreseeing also how probable it was that between States and the citizens of States so closely united, some minor collisions might occur which it would not be expedient to leave to be dealt with by Congress, 'The Constitution' provides for them all by an admirable judicial system. We shall close this chapter, and finally dispose of this branch of our great question, by giving a sketch of that system and

bringing it to apply to our scheme of Federation.

Article 3rd (of the Constitution), section 1.—'The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Section 2.—1st. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State *claiming* lands under grants of different

States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. 2nd. In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.'

De Tocqueville admired intensely this 'Supreme Court'—'A more imposing judicial power,' he says, 'was never constituted by any people. The Supreme Court is placed at the head of all known tribunals, both by the nature of its rights, and the class of justiceable parties which it controls. In the nations of Europe the courts of justice are only called upon to try the controversies of private individuals, but the Supreme Court

of the United States summons sovereign powers to its bar. When the Clerk of the Court advances on the steps of the tribunal and simply says—"The State of New York *versus* the State of Ohio," it is simply impossible not to feel that the Court which he addresses is no ordinary body.' It consists of seven members 'appointed by the Presidents by and with the consent of the Senate.' They hold their office 'during good behaviour,' and the salary assigned to the office cannot be touched either to lessen or increase it, whilst they hold it. It has ever maintained throughout the Union the highest possible repute, and its decrees have been invariably received with unquestioning deference and respect. This Court exercises a most valuable political influence in the government of the United States. 'The Legislature,' says De Tocqueville, 'demands their protection from the designs of the

Executive, the Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the States, the States from the exaggerated claims of the Union; the public interest against the interests of private citizens; and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of democracy.'

In our Federal System this Supreme Court would not have, to be sure, quite so many duties to perform. But it is probable enough that certain cases may arise, slight collisions of interests between two of the three States of our Union, which would make the presence of such a Court most desirable. Suppose such a collision between Scotland and Ireland in some matter touching their fisheries, would it not be very well to have some such thoroughly reliable Court to decide it quietly but peremptorily? Then

we should be favoured with just such a scene as that which struck De Tocqueville so forcibly—'the clerk of the Court advancing on the steps of the tribunal and simply saying, "Ireland *versus* Scotland."'

But besides that, and taking a higher and a wider view—as in our Federal System we have a distinct Imperial Executive and a distinct Imperial Legislature, it is requisite we should have also a distinct Imperial judicature. With respect to all that first class of cases mentioned above as reserved to the Supreme Court in the United States, the English courts of law should have no more right to adjudicate than the Irish or Scotch courts.

How then may we constitute this Imperial Supreme Court? Would not this be a simple and satisfactory method? Each of the three National Governments, the English, Scotch and Irish, would appoint, of course,

their own judges, as well as the whole magistracy of each country. Out of these respective Benches, each Government might select two judges, and the Imperial Government might be free to select one judge anywhere, who would be the President of our 'Supreme Court.' The Court might sit in London, or Dublin, or Edinburgh, according as may be most convenient for the handling of the matter 'twould have to deal with. And for the 'inferior courts which (the Imperial Parliament) may from time to time ordain and establish,' and to which may be assigned cases of smaller interest, the Supreme Court may depute one of their own body.

We have gone at this length and with this minuteness into all the details of the Federal system of 'The States' and their applications to the system which we advocate, with these views:—We hold that if we take up

this great task at all, our best policy will be to perform it thoroughly—in adopting the prolific principle of Federalism to apply it boldly everywhere with an unflinching logical courage; that by forming our plan of Union between these countries as closely as possible upon the model of the Union of the United States, we shall knit more firmly than ever the mightier Union of these two gigantic Empires; and that, by their combined influence, we shall the more readily diffuse over Europe the doctrine and the practice of a sound Federalism, and thus the sooner attain our grand ultimate aim—that *Confederation* of federations which offers to the world the only hope of perpetual peace.

CHAPTER VI.

Diffusion of Federalism on the Continent—Scandinavian Federal Triune Monarchy—German Federal Empire—Austrian Federal Empire, embracing with Equal Affection the Zcheck and the Pole—Italian Federal Monarchy—Spanish and Portuguese (Iberian) Federal Monarchy—French Federal Republic, Belgium going with France and Holland with Germany—A Passing Glance at the Russian, the Greek, and the Turk—Confederation of those Federations—Congress of the United States of Europe—Its Seat of Government the Neutralized Island of Elba—The Pope renouncing, definitively, his Italian States, and Assuming the Title Supreme Pastor of the Re-United Churches of Christendom, First President of the United States of Europe—Or—Our own Island, Gozzo (near Malta) the seat of the European Congress—The Congress to elect their own President—No time to be lost if peace is to be preserved—What's to be done should be done *instanter*.

 ASSING over to the Continent with the concentrated light of these two pure Federalisms—that of the United States and ours,—

let us run up direct to its heights, the high northern SCANDINAVIA. We find there the makings of a triune Federal Kingdom, very like our own, in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. We find there, too, in the most prominent figure in the Peninsula, the King of Sweden, the fullest promise of a bold reformer. Here amongst us, not long ago, he gave us a taste of his quality, and showed himself every inch a King. There is already some likelihood of his assuming the triple crown, having now only the double—Sweden and Norway. In view of the colossal power establishing itself so close at hand, Scandinavia has a plain interest in consolidating itself to the utmost possible. In forming a Federal Union of the three countries, upon our model, the King would have a clear opening to introduce certain necessary reforms in the Government of his own immediate dominion.

In Sweden the Parliament consists of four different representations, the Nobles, the Clergy, the Burghers, and the Peasants; but very differently represented; the Nobles having five hundred representatives, the Clergy sixty, the Burghers eighty-five, and the Peasants about one hundred and forty. All these represent mere class interests, and as every measure must pass through the whole four Houses, it is a perpetual squabble between conflicting interests, and as the natural result, a clumsy and abortive legislation. As a sort of remedy for the disorder, at the commencement of each Diet a standing Committee is chosen, to which all questions, previous to their being finally disposed of in the Chambers, must be referred, and that Committee consists of an *equal* number of members from each Order. In that Committee is the germ of a sound reform, and Sweden, probably, will not be long in learn-

ing that a Diet of two houses is best; the lay lords, with a sprinkling of the spiritual, representing the great estates and the Church; and the Commons, instead of representing mere class interests, representing and protecting all interests alike, representing the whole country equally—its intelligence, its property, and its numbers.

Norway has a purely Democratic Constitution. Its Storthing (Parliament) consists of one hundred members, freely chosen by popular election. Out of this it forms, in a very primitive fashion, two Houses, by dividing them into two unequal parts. The Upper House (Laything) is composed of one-fourth of the members, the Lower House (Odelsthing) of the other three-fourths. In Denmark the Constitution is something of a medium between these two. Its Parliament (Rigsdag) consists of two Houses—the Upper (Landsthing) of fifty members, nineteen

named by the King for twelve years, and the rest elected; and the Lower (Folksthing) of one hundred and one, a popular representation. To this there is a curious adjunct—a sort of moderator in the political machine, called the Rigsraad, consisting of forty-seven members, twelve named by the Crown, six by the Upper House, twelve by the Lower, and seventeen elected. So that we might see in that Federal Triune a counterpart of ours in this—there may be a Conservative Government in Sweden, a Liberal Government in Denmark, and a Radical Government in Norway, without the least disorder in the march of Imperial affairs. The Executive in Norway and Denmark we suppose to remain as they are, and the Federal Imperial Parliament to be constituted like ours. And we assume that our strong Scandinavian power will not ask in vain for the restitution of its Danish Schleswig, pursuant to the Treaty of Prague.

The GERMAN Federal Empire is not a regular Federalism; and not at all likely to be accepted definitively by the German people. It is an improvement on the old Constitution (the *Plenum*), which was only a Staaten-Bund, a loose alliance of States, whilst this purports to be a Bundes-Staat, a States Union. But it is very far from being one on equal terms. Prussia is a great deal too much in the ascendant. We believe it is the predominant sentiment of the German people that Prussia needs very much to be Germanized, and that Germany has no wish at all to be Prussianized; and that feeling, we are sure, must soon bring about a reform of the actual glaring inequality. For instance, in the Federal Senate (Bundesrath) Prussia has seventeen out of fifty-eight votes, whilst Bavaria has but six, Bavaria being unquestionably a more important State than Prussia Proper. And in the voting by the Senate there is this

strange arrangement that *all* the votes of each State must express but one opinion, 'Doch kann die gesammtheit der zust ändigen stimmen nur einheitlick abgegeben werden.' (Verfassung des deutchen Reiches —the Constitution.) This is a wide departure from the true Federal principle. In the Senate in the United States each Senator expresses a personal independent opinion, and in the Swiss Senate 'tis the same. But the Constitution of the Bundesrath is a still wider departure from true Federalism. It is a mere gathering of the Princes of the several States, or their Ambassadors, and in unequal numbers too, as we have seen; instead of being what it is in the United States and in Switzerland, an equal representation, not of the Princes, but of each State, in its capacity as a co-equal sovereignty in the Federal Union. By-the-way, it is to this very circumstance that

Switzerland is at this moment indebted for the salvation of its old time-honoured Constitution. It appears there is in that country a headstrong party of doctrinaires, calling themselves Unionists, who wish to break up the Federal arrangement of the cantonal and local autonomy, and substitute a single centralized Government. In their Lower House, where the larger Cantons have more votes, they have succeeded; but in the Upper (the Federal Council) where, according to the sound Federal principle, the smallest Canton is protected by an equal voting, they have not yet prevailed, and we trust they will not. All our sympathies are with their chief antagonist, M. Dubs, late President of the Republic, who is battling stoutly for the good old Rule.

There is another amendment, however, on the tapis, of a very opposite character. It is *called* an Act of *Settlement*—a very different

affair from our miserable fixture of paupers—an Act conceived in the spirit and formulated upon the model of our great American exemplar—an Act which is to make every native of Switzerland at home in every one of its Cantons—not, as he was before, only in his own—and secure to him the full exercise of all its political rights, and impose upon him the fulfilment of all its political duties.

It is only by restoring its autonomy to Hanover and Hamburgh, and the other States seized by Prussia, by equalizing the representation of each and all the States comprising the Empire, in the Imperial Senate, that the Germans can prevent Prussia solidifying into an overgrown Power, full of danger to the public liberties of the Germanic race; and we believe that amongst the Prussians themselves that sentiment prevails. That haughty *Yunkerdom*—rank as the old

Feudal Lordship—which the Prussian military system has evinced, must be very distasteful to the bulk of the highly educated Prussian people, and they have a significant indication of the tendency of that militarism in the vote upon a recent occasion of Von Moltke himself *against* the proposition that every State in the Bund should have a Representative Assembly; it being made in favour of Mecklenburg, and he a Mecklenburgher! ('Twas carried, however, in spite of him, by a vote of 185 to 83.)

The AUSTRIAN Federal Empire is in a still more sickly state. Having two heads, like its heraldic eagle, the result is, that when either head catches a catarrh or a brain-fever, the whole body is indisposed. The Hungarian pretensions are a good deal in fault. Kossuth, who knows Hungary well, and deserves well of Hungary, wrote a public letter not long ago to the Hungarian Minister

—his own former colleague, and fellow-sufferer too—Count Andrassy, disapproving in strong terms of the jealousy shown to the Zechs by the Magyars. And how strangely inconsistent is that jealousy with their own famous manifesto of '61, in which they proclaim, 'Each country has its memories, its customs, its hopes, and its wishes which are sacred to it. Centralist unity is in opposition with the past of the various countries—a past to which they turn with love and respect—as it is also in opposition with their future hopes. That is why centralization everywhere meets with resistance and obstacles of all sorts. We are convinced that amongst countries differing so much from one another in manners and interests, history and laws, centralist and uniform unity is *an absolute impossibility.*'

The Hungarians, mindful of this declaration, might well be satisfied with holding in

the Austrian Federation the high position of the great State of New York in the American. The New Yorkers love to call themselves the Empire State; but it is only a harmless flourish of trumpets. They do not pretend or affect any domination whatsoever over their weaker neighbours. And so it should be with Hungary, and surrounded as she is by Croatia, and Slavonia, and Transylvania, she ought to be satisfied with being *prima inter equales*. It ill becomes her to treat with any scorn the Zechs; that people in Bohemia and Moravia amounting to near four million, and they but little above five. Still the Magyars are really the nucleus of the Austrian Empire, and this much is fairly due to them, that the Imperial Diet should sit every second year in their capital.

The Germans are also much to blame in this Austrian difficulty. They are not forty per *cent.* even of the Cis-Leithan Austria, and

they persist in obstructing the equal Federalization of the other populations, sacrificing the just pride and the strict rights of every nationality of the Empire to thei own intolerant Germanism, and this they call a devotion to the Constitution !

With a little exercise of good feeling and forbearance, but with a firm and steady hand it would not be difficult to group together all the nationalities of the Empire into a certain number of Autonomies, each having its own Diet, and all contributing equally and proportionately to the Imperial Diet. And where one nationality was awkwardly jammed in with another it would be easy enough to rectify matters, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia, for the religious pacification of some of these very provinces now under notice—namely, by a *migration.* It would only be an exchange of holdings of equal value from one district to another, and

that might be done, and on a large scale too, under Government control and with Government aid, with very little hardship or none at all. And when Prussia and Austria come to a thoroughly good understanding, their first common act may well be to repair at last the crime of the Polish partition; each yielding its share of the plundered provinces. Russia would soon follow, and then may be constituted another Triune Federal Monarchy or Republic like the Scandinavian or ours.

ITALY is plainly marked out by its very geographical outlines for a Federal Constitution. The heart is too remote from the extremities to permit of a healthy political pulsation. And now that the burning desire of her patriots in all times is at last fulfilled in the irrevocable establishment of her Unity, her first thought should be to diffuse the blessings of good government freely throughout the land, and that can be done

only by a Federal Construction of the Monarchy. In every part of that glorious country there are abundant materials for the formation of Local Governments. And there ought to be such in Sicily, in Naples, in the Roman States, in Tuscany with Lucca, Parma with Modina, in Lombardy, in Venice, in Piedmont, and in Sardinia. And as in Italy there is substantially but one nationality, the Local Autonomy need not be so absolute as in our case, and the Governors or Prefects, the Judges and Chief Magistrates, may well be nominees of the Crown.

SPAIN, too, presents obvious indications of its fitness for a Federal Monarchy or a Federal Republic. There is a considerable difference in the manners and customs, and even in the laws of the northern, the southern, and midland provinces. Biscay, for instance, differs in many ways from Granada, Galicia from Leon or Castile. And

as there has been for some time back a tendency towards an incorporation with Portugal, this would be a good opportunity to carry it into effect. Two Local Governments in Portugal, and seven in Spain (making the Balearic Islands one of them) would constitute a strong Iberian Federal Monarchy, consisting of nine States like her sister Italy. And as in that case, so here too, and for the same reason, the Local Autonomy need not be too exacting, and the Crown might have a strong hand everywhere.

In FRANCE, their rigorous centralization is most mischievous. Any disturbance in Paris throws the whole country into disorder. Recently the Government, quite conscious of the mischief, have sought in part to repair it by enlarging the powers of the Councils-General of the Departments. But that is too timid a measure, and will not suffice. *Now* that the sound policy of the Depart-

mental system has produced its full effect, and that the whole country is by its operation so thoroughly welded into one, France need not be afraid to fall back upon her old provinces, and constitute herself a powerful Federal Republic, consisting of nine States, like her kindred Latin races in Italy and Spain. Those States might be Provence, Languedoc, Gascony, Auvergne, Burgundy, Alsace and Lorraine, Champagne, Normandy, and Belgium. We assume Alsace and Lorraine to fall into the French Federation in lieu of Holland to attach itself to the German, and Belgium also by its own hearty accord. These States need not destroy the Departments, but each might consist of a certain number of them.

There is a growing opinion in France in favour of a second Chamber in the Legislature; and a very feasible plan has been suggested—namely, that the Municipal Coun-

cils throughout the country, representing a certain amount of population, should elect one or more Senators to form a second Chamber. Suppose the Lower House in each of these States to consist of members elected to it by popular vote, like those sent now to the National Assembly; suppose its Upper House or Senate to consist of the persons sent up by the Municipal Councils; suppose the national Lower House to consist of a proportionate number of members elected to it by and from each Lower House of the several States, and the Upper House or Second Chamber of the National Parliament to consist of an equal number of Senators, elected to it by a joint sitting of both Houses of each State; would not that simple plan be likely to work smoothly? Here too, and for more urgent reasons—as it is a more volatile people—we would have *the* Central Government endowed in every *State* with ample powers.

We are fully aware how we are exposing ourselves to the sneer of the cynic or the carping of the unsympathizing critic in thus carving out to our taste nearly the whole of Europe, quite at our ease by our fireside. But our excuse is that, as this is our purpose we wish to show by these various applications of Federalism what an infinite capacity it has for harmonizing conflicting interests, and not only appeasing national jealousies and distrusts, but welding unfriendly peoples into steadfast unions. And by this process we are, further, preparing the ground for the broader foundations of a still more expansive development. If Federalism can thus constitute a family of Kingdoms into one Empire, may it not, by a most natural progression, and by the same identical process, group together a family of Empires too, and under the light sway of a Government which, placed as it would be so far beyond the reach

of selfish disturbing passions, high up into the cold region of pure intelligence, may fairly be regarded as the enthronement of human reason itself, guiding in calmness and repose the destinies of mankind, settling by its high arbitrament the differences of kingdoms as easily as those kingdoms now dispose of the differences of their citizens, dismissing for ever the barbarous appeal to the brute-force of war, and thus establishing upon a secure and imperishable basis the peace and happiness of the world.

But how are we to set about this final achievement? In this wise for one. In our *Harmony in Religion* we said, referring to the Italian Government, 'in exchange for Rome they will be well pleased to make over to the Pope, in full sovereignty, the Island of Elba, which he might rebaptize St. Peter's Isle or New Rome. Let him retire there, taking nothing from old Rome but the ashes of the Apostles. Let

him extinguish the hybrid order of Cardinals, then effete and obsolete, and gather around him a little Senate of Bishops, a few from each national church, men of mature years, and after many labours needing repose, each one of whom could, without inconvenience, leave his diocese to the government of a coadjutor.' Since then, and by a happy coincidence, the Pontiff himself would seem to have conceived the same idea, for we find him whispering thus confidingly into the ear of the sympathetic Count d'Harcourt, the French Ambassador, 'that he had given up all thought of recovering the States of the Church, and that he would not accept them even if offered to him, being satisfied with a corner of ground in which he could freely exercise his spiritual functions.'—Jules Favre's 'Rome and the French Republic.' This passage is of course fiercely denied by the partizans of the Temporal Power, blind

and furious fanatics, some of them, alas! in high places even here amongst ourselves, who would not pause to plunge all Europe into a horrible war to recover those States which the Pope himself refuses! But there can be no reasonable doubt of its being substantially accurate. Upon our ear it falls like the first clear utterance of the infallible spirit.

Here then, is a rallying point. St. Peter's Isle may be the seat of our 'Family of Empires,' and be to the European Congress what the site of Washington is to the great Congress of the New World. And this Pope, who seems to be a man of destiny, who in the first year of his Popedom was near being elected the first President of the United States of Italy, may close his wonderful career as first President of the United States of Europe and of the world.

Setting aside all sentimental enthusiasm, and looking at the matter with the cool eye

of reason, what are really the practical feasibilities lying here before us. It is obvious to every sober-minded man that the Pope cannot remain in Rome. The two Governments, the Temporal and the Spiritual, side by side, each affecting to be wholly independent of the other, must necessarily be involved in a perpetual imbroglio, mutually thwarting and mutually corrupting one another. Even in Japan, where that sort of dual Government existed for ages, it is now —only recently—exploded. And, happy omen, 'tis the Tycoon, the Materialist element, is defunct; the Mikado, the *Spirituel* survives. The Papacy has been too long enslaved by the great Catholic Powers. And now it would appear as if Italy too sought to exploit the Pope in its turn.

We have noticed several indications to this effect, and we have this special indication of our own. Having sent a copy of our little book

to the Italian Ambassador, the Marquis Cadorna, directing his attention to the passage quoted above, we received from His Excellency a very courteous reply. In this letter, bearing date, 20 Hill Street, Berkeley Square, Londres, 4 Aout, 1871, we read:—'Et vous verrez aussi, Monsieur, qu'il serait impossible d'attendre de lui (le Gouvernement Italien) aucune act qui eut pour but le depart du Saint Pere de Rome.' So that we can see by this 'impossible' that Victor Emmanuel too has his *non possumus*. That, however, only implies, 'I will not help the Pope to go, but I cannot prevent his going.' No doubt he would be proud to flaunt the Papacy as a feather in his cap. But this amiable Pope, with all his meekness, will spurn the degradation. He is now, we may hope, opening his mind to the conviction that our holy religion should at last cease to be a mere *instrumentum regni*, a political machine,

serving only political purposes, and, please God, we shall soon see an end to all that. The Pope seems now thoroughly aware that the problem as between him and Rome is a Gordian knot and the only solution to cut it. He retires then to the 'little corner of the earth' he longs for, St. Peter's Isle. If he insists, Italy could not possibly refuse it, being but a poor equivalent for the Leonine City. Ceasing to be a Prince himself, he needs no Princes about him. These so-called 'Princes of the Church,' the Cardinals, are expunged, and there is an end of that too long endured and most detrimental *usurpation*, the Italian Government of the Church.

The Pope, then, leaves Rome definitively, establishing there his Vicar as Bishop of that Diocese, and maintaining, through him, the Apostolic succession, and betakes himself to his island in the Mediterranean; and

the Imperial Governments accept him as President. Every Upper House of every Imperial Parliament of Europe sends out to him, to form his Senate, a certain given number of its members, equal in every case —that is the European Upper House. Every Lower House of every Imperial Parliament sends out a proportionate number of its members in the ratio of the populations it represents—that is the Chamber of Deputies of the European Congress. The Pope, as President, selects out of both his Cabinet, and, as Pope, from the Upper House, where there will be several we may be sure, he will select a certain number of Bishops to be his Ecclesiastical Council. That Cabinet need be only a Secretary of State, a Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Postmaster-General, and a Minister of War and of Marine; the Chancellor of the Exchequer to look after the supplies to be contributed by all the Empires for the sup-

port of the common Government, in which they are all interested. The duties of the Secretary of State and the Postmaster are obvious enough; and then as to the two others, it is to be borne in mind that the grand, the high and mighty mission of our European Congress is not merely to settle quietly all minor differences amongst the smaller nations, but to keep the peace with the strong arm between the proudest and the most powerful. It should, therefore, have the supreme command of all the military resources of them all, and in case of need it should appoint its own Commander-in-Chief and its own High Admiral, to whom all the military and naval officers of each country would owe a sworn obedience. It is plain that *this* Parliament needs no judicature, no Supreme Court. It is itself a Supreme Court, a High Court of Arbitration, every Act of which is an irresistible *mandamus*.

And we need hardly add that there could be scarcely any necessity for its meeting every year; once in three years would probably suffice, or exceptionally to meet in case of emergency, and there might be a Permanent Committee for minor affairs, consisting of an equal number of laymen sitting with the Pope's Council.

Let us observe here what an immense service of another, and a higher and a holier character, may be rendered by that European Congress. In our *Harmony in Religion* we suggested how desirable it would be that the Œcumenic Council should appoint a 'Committee of Conference,' of a certain number of Bishops to meet, in friendly interviews, Bishops or other high Ecclesiastics of the Dissenting Churches, to discuss the terms of a general reconciliation. Here in our Congress are the personages at hand to form that 'Committee of Conference,' for there would

be sure to be in it Bishops of two or three Dissenting Churches and other Ecclesiastics, so that the process of effecting a sisterhood of the Churches may go hand in hand with the process of cementing the brotherhood of the nations. And who can tell whether it may not be in the order of a beneficent Providence to turn to this grand account the great accession of power recently accruing to the Holy Father. If in his last days, and in the light of the other world beaming in upon him, he should adopt some beautiful *schema* of universal conciliation, his decree expounding and ordaining it must now be received with unquestioning obedience by the whole Catholic world.

, It would hardly be wise, however, to let the crowning measure of our whole project depend upon such a contingency as the Pope's settling down in Elba, and being adopted for President by our European

Congress. We have something more certain, and somewhat more simple, in view. We have a little isle of our own, and in the Mediterranean too. In the shadow of the frowning heights of Malta, bristling with the grim instruments of war, lies the peaceful little island of Gozzo. That will be a snug retreat for our Congress, and in a joint sitting of both Houses they will elect their own President.

Such, then, is our plan for establishing the Harmony of European International Relations. And we confidently ask the critic, who is not a cynic, is there really anything impracticable, anything extremely difficult, about it? Is it not, in fact, the simple and exact counterpart of what is being done actually under our eyes in the great American Confederation? And we ask him, further, is there any other mode whereby peace can be securely preserved, and the barbarism of war finally and completely extirpated?

And, by-the-way, if we do anxiously desire to preserve this blessed peace we have not a moment to lose, and should hasten to get our plans into working order. It is obvious that France, sorely crippled as she is, is still grimly bent upon a dire war of revenge; lavishly wasting upon that blind resolve all those resources that should be applied to restoring her ordinary well-being. It is equally obvious that Prussia, too, is girding up her loins to accept the battle. Witness her lavish expenditure on her ports in the Baltic, which she seems bent on making a Prussian lake. Can it be possible that Europe will again incur the deep disgrace of allowing so horrible a conflict? There is not a sane man, even in France, that does not shrink at the idea of such a war, and France herself would be well pleased to fling away her sword and shield, if there were only such a salvo for her

wounded pride as the high-handed interference of our Congress would afford. And doubtless the sober-minded German people, too, would rest well satisfied, and covet no more the bitter laurel.

Then take into account, even setting aside for the moment its monstrous atrocity and its infinite horrors, the millions upon millions of war *expenditure* which we ourselves could save by the security of a permanent peace. And Austria and Italy are in the same position; wasting in the same way the treasures which they could better spend on other needs. There is, in fact, not a country in Europe that would not join heartily in the project of our peace-giving Congress, the horrid phantom of war, like a hideous nightmare, oppressing them all alike. The suggested place of meeting of our Congress, the little island of Gozzo, is of very little value to our Government, and they may readily hand it over, and

with a hearty blessing, to the grand purpose in view. Nor need the members attending it have the least apprehension upon the score of discomfort, as Malta, with an abundance of all our modern luxuries and a delicious climate, is close by, within easy reach by ferry, so that everything seems to smoothen the way for the success of our project.

But if, let us add, in our 'more last words,' we reflect for a moment on the vast amount of benefit accruing to ourselves from that success, over and above a military saving, we will instantly and strenuously set to work to attain it. Not only will that Congress be in a position to command the peace between Germany and France, and to save them and all their neighbours, and ourselves more particularly, the ruinous war expenditure of which we are all now alike the victims; but it will further be in a position, and it will be, we may hope, its first great

task, to bring about a better order of things in all those eastern regions whose present disorganized condition is so hurtful to our commerce. It will establish a sound and solid political status, the most beneficial and the most acceptable to the various peoples in the Danubian provinces, in all the troubled and troublous regions of Turkey and of Greece; and say to the Russian Bear himself, 'thus far shalt thou go and no farther,'—and thus leave us undisturbed to discharge more conscientiously the tremendous responsibility we are under in regard to India.

All this—and a great deal more than this, which we shall not touch on now—this Congress would unquestionably be competent to achieve. For it would have at its command all the armies and all the navies of all the Powers represented in it. And we deem it all but certain that the United States would fall in at once with the project, and send

their deputies to that Congress, which would only be the key-stone of that grand arch of Federation of which they themselves have laid so solidly the broad foundations, and which is destined to embrace, in its ever-widening expanse, all the nations.

Nor have we to wait, before we set to work, till we and the other countries shall have completed that true Federal arrangement insisted on in these pages. We may commence forthwith to agitate the matter. Most of the countries on the Continent, as well as this, are even now in a position to contribute their proportion to the construction of our European Congress, and all of them very probably ready and willing to do so. Our own Government it would well become to open the *diplomatic* agitation, as offering the theatre for the grand drama, and the Washington Government could with the best grace second the motion, if once

brought upon the tapis, as the first and chief inspirers of the piece.

Every true man, then, every man of heart and mind, who happens to read these lines, and sympathises with us in our love of peace and hatred of war, every such man we invite, we even conjure by that very love, and that very hatred, to be up and doing; serving the holy cause in every way that is open to him. Let him despise that stupid cant of the Utopia. How many Utopias may we not all remember in our own day. We do ourselves some half-dozen at least, things denounced by timid imbeciles as impossibilities, now established facts. 'Twas a noble saying of Rochefoucauld, bold and true, 'everything is possible, if only the strong will be there.' Begin then, let's begin—only to begin is half the battle won.

Dimidium facti qui cæpit habet. Sapere aude: INCIPE:—*Hor.*

